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The Evolution of Ethnocentrism

Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Robert Axelrod

Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Ethnocentrism is a nearly universal syndrome of attitudes and behaviors, typically including in-group favoritism. Empirical evidence suggests that a predisposition to favor in-groups can be easily triggered by even arbitrary group distinctions and that preferential cooperation within groups occurs even when it is individually costly. The authors study the emergence and robustness of ethnocentric behaviors of in-group favoritism, using an agent-based evolutionary model. They show that such behaviors can become widespread under a broad range of conditions and can support very high levels of cooperation, even in one-move prisoner’s dilemma games. When cooperation is especially costly to individuals, the authors show how ethnocentrism itself can be necessary to sustain cooperation.

Key Words: in-group favoritism • ethnocentrism • agent-based models • evolutionary models • contingent cooperation

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 6, 926-936 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0022002706293470


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